This article explores the problem of governing uncertainty in the secular age by focusing on the theological notion of theodicy as the underlying rationale for the use of torture in the so- 
Introduction
With an impressive acceleration following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , the political and scholarly debate has witnessed a profusion of publications on the relationship between religion and violence. In this debate, two positions have emerged with particular force. On the one hand are scholars like Mark Juergensmeyer who maintain that religious acts of violence tend to be comparatively more destructive, intractable, and uncompromising than secular ones. The reason, he contends, is that the latter are primarily based on the principle of calculative rationality, and therefore not aimed at causing more harm than needed, whereas religious violence stands for divine truths and thus defies means-ends rationality als (Juergensmeyer 2003: 123 ; see also Duffy Toft 2007) . On the other hand, scholars like William
Cavanaugh argue that it is impossible to distinguish between religious and secular acts of violence ts as religious or secular in any given context is a function of different C 2009: 4). Accordingly, labelling certain acts of violence as religious serves as a legitimating function for the secular nation-state and its subjects, whose contain the violence of religious fanatics (Cavanaugh 2009: 4) .
While broadly sympathetic to C argument, this article moves from the perspective that its deconstructive endeavour also falls short of explanatory power. In denouncing the power/knowledge regimes that C approach empties the concept of religious and secular violence of any substantive meaning, thus making it impossible to investigate how the process of secularization has contributed to transforming sovereign violence in its logics, meanings and practices. The aim of this article is to begin such an investigation by exploring the problem of governing uncertainty in the secular age by focusing on the theological notion of theodicy as the underlying rationale for the use of torture in the so-.
The question of governing uncertainty in the secular age has largely been neglected in security studies. The problem of uncertainty, however, G find immanent causes for the that surround them (Beck, 2006: 333) . Hence, taking cue from M W this article argues that in the secular age the problem of theodicy how to reconcile the existence of God with the presence of evil in the world does not disappear, but is mobilised through a Foucauldian biopolitical logic that introduces a break into the domain of life that is under power s control (Foucault 2003, 254) . The primary purpose of secular theodicy is to govern uncertainty through the production of economies of knowledge that rationalize processes of securitization and criminalization of entire groups. The members of these groups the immanent evil and source of threat become responsible not for what they have done, but for who they are that is, their identity becomes the very justification for the violence inflicted on them in a process in which state violence is also a process of construction of threatening subjectivities.
This process, the article will show, is particularly striking when analysing the use of torture in the so-. The theodicy that underpinned medieval torture mobilised an economy of G orture as a process of restoration of a simultaneously immanent and transcendent order. Secular modernity can no longer justify the violence of G to provide a rational explanation for this practice. Indeed, the idea that torture may be considered a scientific practice capable to produce reliable knowledge and actionable intelligence useful to save lives is not supported by scientific and empirical evidence (see, in particular, Welch 2009 and McCoy 2007 , 2012 . Secular torture, it will be argued, is instead the product of a biopolitical theodicy aimed at governing uncertainty through the construction of the tortured as immanent evils who threaten " , in other words, has turned torture in an extreme form of governmentality of uncertainty in which the disciplining of conduct becomes the construction of subjectivities based on essentialist, stereotypical, and racist and for these very reasons, reassuring economies of knowledge.
The arguments advanced in this article should be understood as a contribution to security studies through a deepening of the relationship between security and secularism hence, as a contribution largely (Booth 2007: 448) . Modern rationalities of violence and security in the fight against terrorism cannot be understood without taking into account how they are derivative of theological narratives such as theodicy. This perspective C " ll significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts I our thinking about politics, security, and violence continues to be crucially informed by religious concepts and categories, but it is necessary to understand how these concepts and categories play out in the tensions of the modern secular project. Hence the questions that this article will strive to address: How do secularization and secular theodicy affect the modern governmentality of uncertainty? How can they help explain the use of torture in the so-
Governing uncertainty in a secular age
The impact of secularization on the question of governing uncertainty has been largely neglected in the security studies literature on precautionary risk management. However, as Ulrich Beck (1992;  2006a) has pointed out, humankind to rationalise and reduce risk in the face of uncertainty have unfolded through three macro-historical phases: pre-modernity, first modernity, and second modernity. Pre-modernity revolved around the idea that human beings lived in a Godgiven order where they had no control over tragic events such as droughts, famines, diseases, epidemics, or wars. The reduction of uncertainty, in this phase, was the practical rationalization and acceptance G K embodiment of God). It is with modernity, that is, with the death of God and the development of modern science, that human beings begin to believe that they live in a world of their own making, where they can exercise agency and thus actively intervene to reduce uncertainty and the related risks F B
First modernity was thus characterised by a fundamental belief in science as a tool of intervention and manipulation of the
This utopia, however, has been shattered by the arrival of the second modernity. Science has proven increasingly unable to assist human beings in providing answers to, let alone effectively control, risks that they have actively created such as climate change, global financial crises, the dangers associated with genetic manipulations, global terrorism, and new forms of war. These risks are global in character and unforeseeable in their consequences. A terrorist attack can strike anywhere and climate change knows no national boundaries. Equally, we do not know the magnitude and the H , the logic of non-
U B
The attempt to resist the uncertainty of the modern secular condition has produced two main outcomes. First, it F B belief spreads in proportion to the growth of insecurity triggered by radicalized modernization processes in every sp N -modern, but thoroughly modern. They do not seek to revive the orthodox framework of institutionalized B 2010: 85) that, in order to restore a dimension of subjective certainty against the ambiguity and moral relativism of modernity, authorizes the use of fundamentalist violence (Beck 2010: 171) .
The counterpoint to this process has been a paradoxical and even greater reliance on science and technology as means to reduce uncertainty through the development of precautionary and preemptive risk management. This approach no longer rests on the calculation of possible scenarios, Beck (2006a: 335 boundary between rationality an T in order to protect their populations from the danger of terrorism, states increasingly limit civil rights and liberties, with the result that in the end the open, free society may be abolished, but the terrorist threat is by no means averted. The dark irony here is that, while very general risk-induced doubts in the benevolence of the promises of governments to protect their citizens lead to criticisms of the inefficiency of scholarly and state authorities, critics are blind to the possibilities of erecting (or expanding) the authoritarian state on this very inefficiency (Beck, 2006a: 335-36 ).
Beck seems to suggest that the expansion of the authoritarian state and the related compression of response of governments under pressure from a concerned and distraught public opinion which demands a security that governments cannot deliver. Indeed, he (2006b) argues, governments have no way of knowing that the security measures adopted and the violence deployed are rational from an instrumental point of view because nce, nor the politics in power, nor the mass media, nor business, nor the law nor even the military are in a position to define or control risks This argument, however, does not seem to take into account the possibility that the authoritarian state may not be the product of irrational, inefficient or misguided assumptions, but the outcome of a governmental rationality which has as its goal not exclusively and not primarily security but the power to conduct of conduct of others (Foucault 1991) .
Certainly, such as (Aradau and Van Munster 2007: 91) , extraordinary rendition, administrative detention, and torture, may appear to be instrumental to achieve the reduction of risk and uncertainty associated with the terrorist threat. However, the very nature of the threat based on the unforeseable, the unknown unknowns, something we do not even know exists (Beck 2006: 335) suggests that these measures may be the opportunity to establish new governmental practices that affect behaviour and construct forms of ordered agency and subjectivity in the population to be governed (Aradau and Van Munster 2007: 97) , including the willing acceptance of security measures that curb individual freedoms, undermine equality, and treat human dignity as a disposable commodity. From this perspective, the uncertainty of the current second modernity has not had a subtractive effect on state power governing despite uncertainty but a productive one governing through uncertainty. Uncertainty has become something that needs to be governed and yet an opportunity for establishing new forms of power.
In the next section, elaborating on the work of Max Weber and Michel Foucault, I analyse how the combined effect of governing uncertainty and governing through uncertainty that characterises secular governmentality relies on the economies of knowledge of secular theodicy. The latter constructs nfliction of violence on them on the ground that this is necessary to preserve the life that is worth living.
Theodicy, governmentality, and biopolitics
I W attempt to reduce uncertainty are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing dimensions which all spring from a common root, namely, T H to be at once omnipotent and kind could have created such an irrational world of undeserved suffering, un (Weber 1946: 122) How is it possible, in other words, that God allows the manifestation of evil? Weber considers irrationality and uncertainty as two sides of the same coin, and religions as the first forms of practical rationalization which aimed to address the irrationality and uncertainty of the world stemming from the problem of theodicy. Accordingly, religious doctrines such as the original sin, the principle of the corrupt nature of humanity, the idea that e G reincarnation or a better life in heaven, are all manifestations of a practical rationality that made violence and suffering meaningful and acceptable as part of G transcendent order and legitimized the use of violence in the name of that very order.
According to Weber, however, these rationalizations also raised a question of entitlement for those who were spared the evils of suffering and violence. Although most philosophers and theologians have looked at theodicy as the problem of how to reconcile the presence of evil in the world with the existence of God, Weber considered that a fundamental dimension of theodicy was also to explain the absence of evil for those who were fortunate enough to be spared its consequences.
Hence, for the German sociologist, a related but hardly explored (indeed, by Weber himself) This is how he (1946: 271) explains the The fortunate is seldom satisfied with the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needs to know that he has a right to his good fortune. He wants to be convinced that he s. He wishes to be allowed the belief that the less fortunate also merely experiences his due. Good fortune thus wants to be Religion, Weber (1946: 271) continues, has contributed to rationalize the inequality between groups or classes o ymptom of odiousness in the eyes of the gods and as a sign
Although Weber discusses theodicy as part of a religious epistemic framework, this notion refers -" . Indeed, social theory has paid term for theodicy that shifts the explanation of the problem of evil in the world from God to the social domain. Sociodicy has been employed to account for those secular narratives that rationalize and legitimize conditions of se conditions
M W
These narratives include, among others, the liberal idea that income inequalities can be an incentive for the worst-off to improve their condition E 1981: 10). Similarly, Pierre Bourdieu (1998: 35; 2003: 33) has argued that neojustifies suffering on the own condition. Loïc Wacquant (2009: 6) contends that -Darwinist and penal social order. Whereas the latter s/social prisons and prisons/judicial ghettos in order to neutralize the material and/or symbolic threat that [they pose]... for (Wacquant 2009: 6, 198) . Hence, in the practical rationalizations of sociodicy, a process of criminalization and securitization takes place whereby the poor become a threat to democracy, the homeless to security, the migrant to identity, the homosexual to morality and the family, the Muslim to secular or Christian values, and so on.
These examples show elements of both the theodicy of suffering and of good fortune. The condition of the poor their suffering is necessary for the common good, but is also their responsibility, and thus they B G , in the same way that the wealthy and successful deserve their fortune. Yet, these examples also point to a dimension not explored by Weber, namely, how the poor and the marginalised may represent a threat, a source of risk and uncertainty for the society as a whole and in particular for the dominant groups within society that requires the adoption of measures of punishment, containment, and control.
This latter point raises a central question for our discussion: If the problem of theodicy has survived the process of secularization by turning into sociodicy, and given that, following Weber, the very problem of uncertainty stems from theodicy, how does secular theodicy affect the modern governmentality of uncertainty? In order to answer this question, I will analyse how the concept of sociodicy, although never explicitly discussed by Michel Foucault, can be seen to have an important role in his account of the transformation of power from sovereignty to governmentality.
According to Foucault (1978: 136) , until the nineteenth century, power was exercised mainly as a means of
The the right to take life or let live F I nineteenth century, however, a profound transformation starts to take place. Power turns primarily into one of production, whose main F T take life or let , Foucault contends (1978, a power to foster life or disallow it , thus marking the birth of biopolitics (Lemm and Vatter, 2014: 2) . 1 Power no longer manifests itself exclusively through the law, but through a series of disciplinary and regulatory apparatuses and regimes, such as the police, schools, health insurance systems, patterns of consumption, education, and reproduction (Foucault 2003, 250 251) . These regimes are not enacted through a direct exercise of sovereign power, but through processes of internalisation of norms, codes, and models of behaviour that directly invest life. In this politicsturned-biopolitics, these regimes are designed to inscribe a specific order onto the body which may ntegration into systems of efficient and F , and create the framework of conduct in which individuals may govern themselves.
It can be suggested that sovereign power and biopolitical power rest on different tensions. which is not an unqualified attempt to promote life, but a specific attempt to promote life that is worth living and is threatened by forms of life considered less valuable. This means that with the shift from sovereignty to biopolitics/governmentality, killing turns into a rational and racialized hreats that surround them. Hence in a secular age in which the world is no longer God-given, but a construction of the ruling classes, the wealthy, the healthy, the civilized, the moderns, and the rational, the secular theodicy of good fortune is a form of rationalization that, mobilised through biopolitical logics, introduces a break into the domain of life that is under power's control (Foucault 2003, 254) and authorizes the use of violence. Violence thus becomes a governmental practice whose instrumental task is not, primarily, to contain or eliminate the threat stemming from certain populations, but to construct identities and subjectivities: the poor, the barbarians, the premoderns, the fundamentalists, the fanatics, those who want to destroy our way of life on the one hand; the liberal, civilised, secularised and democratic on the other. The secular theodicy of good fortune at the heart of biopolitics legitimizes this divide by justifying the condition of the former and the violence inflicted as a sign of . This argument suggests that theodicy continue to play an important role in rationalizing and justifying modern forms of violence. Yet, these rationalizations are the product a secular economy of knowledge. Religious rationalizations of violence rested on the idea of an underlying correspondence between the immanent world and the transcendent order, and interpreted and justified suffering and the infliction of suffering as part of this theological framework. In secular modernity, suffering is no long G design, but a social pathology engendered by those forces and agents the lesser races that wish to disrupt the good life. These forces are not transcendent, but immanent and thus the economy of knowledge that oversees secular forms of violence focuses on the capacity or the illusion of the capacity to know, measure, control and ultimately master these forces. However, in the modern biopolitical order, the process of knowledge, measurement, control and mastery is also a process of construction of subjectivities.
In the next section, this conceptual framework will be employed to account for the shift from medieval practices of torture primarily informed by the theodicy of suffering to secular forms of torture primarily shaped by a biopolitical theodicy of good fortune. The focus will be on how torture in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib may be understood as a form of governmentality of uncertainty that rests on and fosters forms of biopolitical racialization unknown to medieval forms of torture.
Theodicy and the secularization of torture
The economy of knowledge that characterized medieval forms of torture up to the eighteenth century revolved around the quest for coherence between the immanent and the transcendent order. At the heart of this quest was the tension of the classical model of sovereignty the Hobbesian paradox, with the individual caught between a hidden God and an earthly ruler who protected life but also had the right to kill and inflict violence which had in the theodicy of suffering a way to stabilize its contradictions. As Foucault explains in his classic Discipline and Punish, the purpose of torture was not so much to redress the injury suffered by its victim, but to repair the crime committed against the law, itself expression of sovereign power. The crime was a direct attack to the body of the sovereign (Kantorowicz 1997: 155) . As the only one who had the power to mediate between God " P ble to interpret and enforce the Law of God (Hobbes 2008) . For this reason, torture was a form of repentance for the crime that had been committed against God and the king, and therefore a way to restore an immanent order, itself expression of a transcendent order.
To restore the violated order, the king exercised his sovereign right to kill through the infliction T constructive meaning: pain was useful; it was a way to unlock secrets of the human mind and the C T the truth (Kahn 2008: 22, 26) , in the form of admission of guilt and recognition on the part of the offender that his action had caused offence to both God and the king. In this respect, the evil of torture G To suffer was to eliminate the self, the will, and self consciousness in order to make room for God,
G "
Together with the pain of the tortured, whose bodies were pierced, burned, quartered, hooked, and dismembered according to sophisticated techniques aimed at maximizing their physical suffering, an essential component of torture was the public and its fear. Torture was public because it stood as was likely to be punished, but by arousing feelings of terror by the spectacle of power letting its anger fall upon the guilty . Their lives have emerged as a threat to our capacity to grow, expand and flourish that is, as a threat in a discourse which has framed them as worse than medieval sinners on the scaffold. Whereas the latter were people who had committed the most ignominious crimes, but who could still repent and redeem themselves through the ritual of public torture, the U" (Ballen and Bergen, 2008) destroy our lives and who therefore .
Indeed G W 111) that did not exist in classical torture given the proximity between the tortured and the public.
As was argued, this proximity was a disciplinary measure, but also an indication that they belonged to the same human community. This meant, among other things, that the tortured would not be denied an ultimate act of compassion, that is, death, which would mean freedom from their agony and reconciliation with the divine. This compassion, however, has been denied to the Guantanamo prisoners, who -he intelligence they could provide.
Harvesting intelligence is a task that terrorism. The latter, unhindered from this existential threat, will be able to grow, proliferate and expand a precepts of modern secular theodicy.
For this transfer of value to be possible, however, there must be certainty that the method employed will not prompt false intelligence and will not kill the tortured. It is from these two concerns that modern practices of torture, rebranded in the context of the war on terror as A M C to the techniques of psychological torture researched and tested by the CIA in the 1950s. This --eing chained to a bolt on the floor for days, thus forcing the tortured to soil themselves), sensory deprivation (being hooded for hours, prolonged isolation, temperature manipulation, being exposed to loud noise for extended period times), cultural and sexual humiliation (being forced to wear the physical and psychological effect are deeply intertwined and mutually reinforcing. These techniques, which have been widely used in Guantanamo, rest on two seemingly scientific assumptions: physical torture creates resistance whereas psychological torture combined with selfinflicted pain can contribute to unlocking the secrets of the mind of the prisoner and force him to deliver valuable information. There is, however, an underlying paradox at the heart of these practices. Their alleged scientific value and capacity to produce valuable intelligence which may save lives has been deeply questioned by a vast array of critics, including academics, intelligence and security experts, and In order to answer this question we need to consider how the secularized theodicy that justifies the use of torture is a key component of the modern governmentality of uncertainty, whose main task is to identify immanent causes for the threats that surround us, as it is no longer possible to explain evil as the expression of a God-given order. Although it is known that torture does not work, that it is useless, immoral and counterproductive, this knowledge is ignored in favour of a different economy of knowledge the main task of which is to preserve the belief that the state may act as the ultimate agent of salvation against the terrorist threat by unravelling the truth from the tortured. From this perspective, the instrumental rationality of torture is not in the valuable information it may produce, but in the construction of threatening subjectivities which may fit and comply with an already existing cognitive framework based on a secularised theodicy that only goal is to annihilate our way of life (our good fortune).
In the secular age, which has to create meaning and order for itself as the world is no longer Godordained, the governmentality of uncertainty encompasses the ontological construction of the tortured as the expression of an inferior life. Underpinned by a theodicy of good fortune, modern stiny. Modern torture is the product of a secular economy of knowledge in which, as Weber reminds us, there are no inscrutable transcendent forces at play and everything, in principle, can be mastered. Accordingly, modern secular torture ceases to be ritual and becomes seemingly scientific practice underpinned by instrumental rationality whose mind may be unlocked, that their secrets may be acted upon. However, the failure to provide scientific justification for the practice of torture requires the adoption of a theological framework of meaning, albeit in a secularized form. Secular theodicy thus turns torture in an essential component of the modern governmentality of uncertainty. The latter revolves around the construction of threatening identities based on essentialist, stereotypical, and racist forms of knowledge and produces a biopolitical racialization that reinforces our existing cognitive frameworks. The secular theodicy at the heart of this process makes the violence of secular torture meaningful and acceptable as the tortured terrorists end up merely deserving their due.
Conclusion
According to William Cavanaugh (2009: 6) , the idea that religions may be more prone to violence ideologies and institutions labelled secular can be just as absolutist, divisive, and irrational as those labelled religious . While agreeing with this argument, this article has tried to advance the discussion beyond the critique that the secular may be as violent as the religious by beginning an investigation on the economies of knowledge that shape and inform secular violence. The analysis has strived to fill an important gap in the security studies literature on governmentality and uncertainty by exploring how secularization has endowed modernity with a distinctive crisis of uncertainty which has made possible the development of new forms of governmentality based on secular theodicy. Biopolitics and secular theodicy have emerged as mutually sustaining power/knowledge regimes that justify and authorize secular forms of violence nsequences in . Yet, the article argued, this violence is part of a governmental process of construction of identities whereby the threatening other is forced to comply with an already existing racialized knowledge for the purpose of governing uncertainty.
From this perspective, torture in the war on terror was shown to be more a project of construction of identities than an instrumental-rational endeavour aimed at extracting information that may save lives. Unlike medieval practices of torture informed by the theodicy of suffering and aimed at reestablishing coherence between the immanent and the transcendent order torture carried out in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo should be considered primarily an instantiation of the modern governmentality of uncertainty resting on a secular theodicy of good fortune. The latter operates essentialist, stereotypical, and racist cognitive frameworks whether in the form of the terrorists who have no other goal than the destruction of our way of life, or in the shape of the backward Muslim subject. The comparison with medieval practices showed how, in the process of secularization, torture has not become more has simply been informed by a different economy of knowledge that can no longer explain evil as the product of a transcendent order and has to responsible for the threats that surround us.
The deepening of the relationship between security and secularism advanced in this article was guided by the idea that rlying political theory (Booth, 2007: 109, 150) , and that, therefore, curity cannot be separated from the most W In exploring how secularization has affected modern perceptions of uncertainty and how secular theodicy shapes and justify modern forms of violence such as torture, this article has strived to advance the debate on the relationship between security and subjectivity. In this regard, this article suggests that the of the modern secular condition cannot just be understood as a form of liberation, but also as an absence, that includes an underlying condition of uncertainty. I G F -67). This sense of absolute freedom, which encompasses the very construction of subjectivity, cannot be separated from a condition of uncertainty that instrumental rationality cannot address, as the capacity to manipulate and control the world ultimately remains beyond human reach, no matter how powerful a state may be. Secular violence such as torture thus becomes a tool of the governmentality of uncertainty that operates through the construction of threatening others as immanent source of evil. This process draws on an exploitation of the fear of the unknown, which is also the main question at the heart of theodicy.
Indeed, the theological problem of theodicy is one of lack of knowledge: precisely because we do not know whether God exists we ask how his (or her) existence may be reconciled with something evil that is antithetical to his (or her) very being. Ultimately, the existence of God and the manifestation of evil are reconciled by inscribing the latter into the grand design of the former, and by conceiving of evil as good for human beings (however cryptic and inscrutable this good may be).
In the modern secular order, however, there is no grand design and the responsibility of evil shifts from the transcendent Other (God) to the immanent other (the terrorist), who becomes a threat to . However, despite their physical nature, the terrorists/immanent others remain almost as unknown as God because there is often no way to know who they are and when they may strike. The response to this lack of knowledge and condition of uncertainty is the biopolitical theodicy explored in this article:
the construction of identities and subjectivities that may embody and by embody, somehow circumscribe and give the illusion of mastering that very threat.
However, to the extent that the construction of identity cannot happen in isolation from the construction of difference, the construction of threatening others is also the construction of ourselves. Governing the uncertainty of terrorism becomes the opportunity for new governmental practices aimed at disciplining conducts and establishing new forms of power that make us more apathetic in accepting of security measures that restrain individual freedoms, undermine equality, and deem human dignity as a disposable luxury. 
